但足球世界的残酷在于，荣耀的保质期极短。

1、多宝登录 9月随荷兰国家队出征期间，德容再度肌肉受伤，错过了巴萨多场比赛。

（文｜公司观察，作者｜苏启桃，编辑｜曹晟源）7月17日，努比亚的AI宠物机器人iMoochi将正式上线，AI宠物赛道又添一员大将。多宝登录"世界模型第一股"的头衔，迟早会有公司戴上，极佳视界会是那个名字吗？收回线上经营权，能成为耐克中国的解药吗？ 7月22日，滔搏国际、宝胜国际在港交所公告中确认收到耐克集团的正式通知，其在中国内地的耐克产品线上平台销售将于2027年1月1日起全面终止。

2、英格兰太强了，阿根廷队看来难进决赛，卫冕冠军黄金一代谢幕

足球通常告诉年轻人：排队等着。

3、一岁一除夕，一年一团圆。

年少成名带来的冠军既是王冠，也是枷锁。

4、CBA最新消息！中国男篮世界排名下降，洛夫顿引多支欧洲球队争抢，广东外援重返广州

在这场“技术流”与“身体流”的巅峰对话中，西班牙队凭借亚马尔制造的点球（奥亚萨瓦尔主罚命中）以及下半场波罗的单刀破门，以2-0完胜夺冠第一热门法国队。

5、正式确定！中国男篮锋线大将完成转会，加盟北控男篮

"每一步都在点上"，这是同行对黄冠的普遍评价。

当国外设备断供时，一场外部制裁引发的国产化大浪潮，就这样开始了。

目前雅伊斯勒排在米兰选帅名单的最后一名。

6、温网比赛前要先脱婚纱才开打，网球服现在这么离谱了吗？

南非主帅布鲁克斯主打4-2-3-1体系，中场与后防线站位紧密，双后腰组成拦截屏障，边后卫基本不压上，整体防线回收很深。

下半场第60分钟，姆巴佩用一记无解的兜射直挂死角，将功补过，打破了场上僵局。

7、聚焦未来！「青少年篮球发展交流大会」天津见｜活动

当中国球迷和全球球迷同时看球时，一些不一样的风景在同步悄然上演。

更加精准有效实施逆周期调节，推动中长期资金稳步提升入市规模和比例，加强应对全球市场波动和风险跨境传导的政策储备，筑牢防范外部风险冲击的防波堤防浪堤。

8、两记头球大逆转！山东泰山b队2比1战胜上海赛更达，三分钟失球，闫恒烨头球扳平，邓淳泽头球反超，少赛一场继续领跑积分榜_网易订阅

这套中场架构兼顾了经验与活力，硬度与技术的搭配更为均衡。

唯一一次成年队交锋还要追溯到1972年的慕尼黑奥运会，当时哥伦比亚3-1击败加纳。

1/16决赛3比0轻取奥地利展现传控功底；1/8决赛对阵葡萄牙的伊比利亚德比，直到第91分钟才由替补登场的梅里诺完成绝杀；1/4决赛面对比利时，又是梅里诺在第89分钟完成绝杀。

9、NBA官方：亚克塞尔-伦德伯格当选拉斯维加斯夏联MVP

展望下半年到明年，锂供给的释放仍存在较大不确定性，核心原因在于过去2-3年锂价持续低迷，行业缺乏大规模资本开支，当前能够投产的项目多为更早前已投入建设的产能，行业整体扩产节奏较为节制。

这届出现在看台上的大佬，可以说几乎家家都在猛攻美国市场。

10、曼城主席强硬拒售罗德里，皇马准备上亿英镑报价

杨晓煜认为To B的核心不是“简单粗暴砍人头”，而是“提效增收”。

曦智科技方面透露，截至目前，该光跃超节点解决方案已实现了数千卡商业化落地，建成了国产第一个光互连光交换超节点集群。

1、王虹、邓煜为啥能获菲尔兹奖？

21万辆车，一颗“雷” 对比一下，极氪001的电池问题涉及约3.8万辆车，走了召回程序。

2、中国澳门公开赛：蒋振邦/魏雅欣合体夺冠，胡哲安首度登顶

让我们拭目以待，见证2026世界杯冠军的诞生，也见证这场属于阿迪达斯的完美胜利。

3、北京未来三天仍多分散性雷阵雨 最高气温升至30℃以上闷热感渐强

巴菲特在2008年金融危机中投资高盛就是类似的凸性投资。这双 JOURNAL STANDARD 限定 Vans 搭得太对味儿了莫德里奇原本是打算随队再踢1年，前提条件是能够参加下赛季欧冠。

4、塔图姆正式复出！东部格局要变天啦？

如果丘库埃泽能够适应翼卫的防守纪律，萨勒马科尔斯在右路的先发优势将被大幅削弱。

5、谢晖｜90分钟，一个世界

”孙卓则强调，“抓住需求，就能找到商业化切口。

6、王楚钦将缺席WTT欧洲大满贯赛瑞典站

中场核心佩德里在本届世界杯中状态有所下滑，这也是他首次在国家队生涯中替补出场。

贝林厄姆成为最粗大腿，本届赛事已贡献6粒进球，对阵挪威一役梅开二度直接率队晋级，队报给出9分全场最高分。

挪威主打4-3-3阵型，核心框架围绕双核构建——锋线哈兰德负责终结，中场厄德高负责调度。

7、申花开赛至今都没5外援首发 依然足协杯进8强 联赛赢了8场 平了5场

巴萨即将完成对比利时边锋杰西·比西武的签约，这笔交易已基本板上钉钉。

但对这位少年而言，个人纪录远不如团队荣誉重要。

8、值得「纯」爱_网易订阅

热身赛数据显示，英格兰场均控球率达到69.1%，场均射门17.6次，被射门仅6.2次，攻防两端展现出统治级表现。

有意思的是，彼时米兰外租球员海于格就在阵中，他的买断触发条件为法鹰夺取欧联杯，谁曾想真就这么达成了。

特林康的加盟，只是沙特联赛疯狂引援的一个缩影。

（文｜出海参考，作者｜王璐，编辑｜罗文琴）Nextfin News — On July 22, latest research from Omdia showed that despite total market shipments dropping by over ten percent in the second quarter, Vivo—excluding its iQOO sub-brand—maintained its top position in the Indian smartphone market with 6.3 million units shipped. Yet despite its strength in the market, Vivo was unable to keep full control over its manufacturing plants in India. There is an unwritten law in the corporate world that market share acts as a moat and scale brings bargaining power. But in India, Vivo has just seen that principle turned on its head—and in a remarkably brutal fashion. On July 9, an official approval was finally granted. Dixon Technologies announced to the stock exchange that Vivo India received a clearance letter issued on July 8 by India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Under this approval, the manufacturing operations Vivo built over twelve years in India will formally be folded into a joint venture controlled fifty-one percent by a local partner. According to industry analyses, the new entity has a paid-up capital of just fifty million rupees—around three and a half million yuan—yet it is taking over a mega-factory designed for an annual capacity of over one hundred million units and backed by a workforce of more than ten thousand employees. Viewed in isolation, this transaction reads like a story of loss. But when placed back into the context of Vivo’s global footprint, its true nature changes entirely. India remains Vivo’s largest overseas market, ranking first in 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, accounting for roughly one-third of the brand's total global volume. Overseas operations already contribute more than half of Vivo's global revenue, with targets set to raise that share to sixty percent this year and seventy percent by 2027. This shift in India does not merely affect a single regional market; it alters the structural load-bearing pillar of Vivo’s entire global strategy. With the Indian chapter coming to a close, Vivo now faces far more practical questions about its future: What exactly did this equity restructuring change, and how will the brand navigate its next phase of globalization? A Three-and-a-Half-Million Yuan Outlay for a Three-Hundred-Billion Revenue Business By securing a fifty-one percent controlling stake, Dixon leveraged its position to capture a cash cow with an annual revenue potential estimated between two hundred fifty billion and three hundred billion rupees—roughly twenty-one billion to twenty-five billion yuan. This revenue guidance originates directly from Dixon’s own management team. As early as May, Dixon founder Sunil Vachani revealed that the joint venture would handle approximately two-thirds of Vivo’s smartphone sales in India, representing over twenty million units annually. JPMorgan further projects that the joint venture will add around eleven million smartphone shipments in fiscal year 2027, scaling up to approximately twenty-two million units annually across fiscal years 2028 and 2029. From India's perspective, this outcome represents a decisive policy victory. Looking back at Vivo’s expansion abroad, its capital deployment in India consisted of substantial physical investments. According to an official press release issued by Vivo India in April 2023, the company outlined a total investment plan of seventy-five billion rupees. The first phase called for thirty-five billion rupees by the end of 2023, of which twenty-four billion had already been allocated alongside plans to inject an additional eleven billion rupees by year-end. The new facility in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, spans roughly 169 acres—a site acquired back in 2018 that officially went into operation in mid-2024. It currently holds an annual production capacity of sixty million units, with plans to double that figure to one hundred twenty million upon full completion, rivaling the footprint of Samsung’s largest manufacturing plant in the country. By 2018, Vivo's earlier facility was already generating a monthly output of around one million units while employing nearly ten thousand local workers. What do these figures truly signify? They demonstrate that Vivo was never just a consumer brand in India; it had built an end-to-end manufacturing system, a local supply chain, and a massive employment ecosystem. The company replicated its battle-tested Chinese ground-sales model across India, extending from major metropolitan shopping centers down to rural retail shops across roughly seventy thousand touchpoints. It even transformed India into an export hub, shipping Indian-made smartphones to Thailand and Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2022, with export targets exceeding one million units in 2023. Yet after 2024, every one of these capital investments transformed into a distinct disadvantage at the negotiating table. Faced with mounting regulatory pressure, Vivo initiated discussions in 2024 with major domestic players including Tata Group, Murugappa Group, and Dixon Technologies to explore joint ventures or contract manufacturing options, though early negotiations stalled. In December 2024, Vivo signed a non-binding term sheet with Dixon Technologies, initiating a protracted government approval process that dragged on for nineteen months. Upon closing, the joint venture will purchase selected manufacturing assets from Vivo for an undisclosed amount, sign dedicated production and packaging agreements with Vivo India, handle a substantial share of its OEM orders, and retain the flexibility to manufacture for third-party brands down the line. With an initial capital commitment of just 25.5 million rupees, Dixon gains access to established assembly lines, skilled workers, an integrated supply chain, and guaranteed orders from a brand selling over thirty million phones a year. In return, Vivo retains only the right to continue selling smartphones in the Indian market alongside a forty-nine percent financial yield on equity. Using a newly incorporated entity with a registered capital of merely fifty million rupees to take control of an advanced industrial plant capable of producing over one hundred million units annually is virtually unprecedented in global business history. Vivo understood the gravity of the concessions, but faced with severe regulatory constraints, it was left with few alternatives. Why Did Stronger Sales Lead to Heavier Constraints? Under standard market conditions, Vivo’s operational execution in India was textbook perfect. According to data from market research firm Omdia, Vivo—excluding iQOO—led the Indian smartphone market throughout 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, marking a nineteen percent year-over-year growth rate. Samsung trailed in second place with twenty-three million units and a fifteen percent share. By the fourth quarter, Vivo widened its lead even further, shipping 7.9 million units in a single quarter to capture twenty-three percent of the market. Securing the top spot in the world's second-largest smartphone market—a region absorbing roughly one hundred fifty-four million devices annually—should have been a landmark corporate victory after twelve years of dedicated effort. However, as policy priorities shifted unexpectedly, the very capital-heavy assets Vivo spent years building transformed into immobilized leverage against the company. In April 2020, India enacted Press Note 3, requiring case-by-case government review for all direct foreign investments originating from countries sharing a land border. This rule effectively blocked capital injection channels for Chinese entities. Over the following years, regulatory scrutiny targeting Chinese smartphone manufacturers steadily intensified. In July 2022, authorities accused Vivo India of illicitly remitting 624.76 billion rupees back to China under the guise of tax avoidance. Vivo was hardly the only brand reshaped by this changing regulatory framework. Enforcement agencies froze 55.51 billion rupees of Xiaomi India’s assets in a dispute that remains unresolved; OPPO received a customs tax demand totaling 43.89 billion rupees; Transsion's manufacturing subsidiary, Ismartu India, surrendered a 50.1 percent controlling stake to Dixon; and HKC’s joint venture with Dixon was approved under a seventy-four to twenty-six equity structure. Faced with these conditions, Vivo was forced into a harsh binary choice: abandon its sunk costs and hand over billions of rupees in physical plants and distribution networks, or accept majority control by a local partner in exchange for permission to remain in the market. The restructuring struck directly at the primary engine of Vivo’s international business. India is not just another regional market for Vivo; it is its largest overseas pillar. In March of last year during the Boao Forum for Asia, Vivo COO Hu Baishan emphasized two key realities to Bloomberg: India is Vivo's most critical international market, and with overseas sales contributing over half of total revenues, the company is aiming for sixty percent in 2026 and seventy percent by 2027. In essence, the restructuring in India does not just adjust a local subsidiary; it alters the foundational premise of Vivo’s global expansion story. The "deep localization" playbook—building local plants, hiring local workforces, and cultivating local component ecosystems—long viewed as an ideal blueprint for overseas expansion, saw its ownership structure unilaterally rewritten in its most prominent market. Without Direct Plant Ownership in India, How Will Vivo Secure One-Third of Its Global Footprint? From a strategic standpoint, Vivo officially characterizes its international methodology as "More Local, More Global." The strategy relies on manufacturing localization through plants in markets like India and Brazil; marketing localization via major cultural partnerships ranging from the Indian Premier League to official sponsorships at the UEFA European Championship; and channel localization by exporting its field-sales distribution networks. The effectiveness of this approach is undeniable, as evidenced by Vivo holding the top market position in both India and Indonesia. Yet Vivo’s challenges in India expose the inherent vulnerabilities of this model: an over-concentration in specific regional markets and the property-rights risk associated with capital-heavy physical infrastructure. Pushing "More Local" to its logical extreme means anchoring factories, workforces, and supply chain assets entirely within foreign legal jurisdictions. Under favorable conditions, these assets form competitive barriers; during regulatory shifts, they turn into operational exposure. The deeper Vivo planted its roots in India over twelve years, the less leverage it retained during structural negotiations. Another challenge lies in Vivo's limited footprint across premium segments and developed Western markets. In discussions with Bloomberg, Hu Baishan noted that Vivo has paused expansion into developed regions like the United States and Western Europe, where carrier channels and Apple hold dominant positions, preferring instead to consider entering via new product categories over a three-to-five-year horizon. In India, the focus shifts toward expanding presence in the premium segment above six hundred dollars. In short, Vivo’s international expansion remains focused primarily on mid-to-entry segments across emerging markets, offering thinner profit margins. A six percent decline in Southeast Asian regional shipments in 2025 serves as a clear reminder of these market dynamics. So where does the company go from here? Part of the answer is already visible in Vivo’s recent strategic adjustments. First, Vivo is reframing its presence in India, shifting from a direct asset-owning manufacturer to a brand, technology, and distribution coordinator. This setup preserves market share, protects cash flow, maintains a forty-nine percent financial yield, and allows its premium product plans to proceed as intended. This structural pivot is not mere external speculation; it is explicitly defined by the mechanics of the joint venture agreement. According to regulatory filings submitted by Dixon, the joint venture is mandated to carry out three specific operational functions: acquire selected manufacturing assets from Vivo, execute contract manufacturing and packaging agreements with Vivo India, and fulfill OEM orders—initially covering roughly two-thirds of Vivo’s local sales volume before opening up capacity to third-party brands. In other words, the joint venture functions as a contract manufacturer, while product R&D, branding, pricing strategy, and retail distribution remain controlled by Vivo India. Holding a forty-nine percent equity stake, Vivo transitions to an equity accounting model rather than full revenue consolidation while retaining proportional board representation to safeguard its governance voice. Simply put: manufacturing operations transfer to a locally controlled partner, while the commercial brand and retail business remain firmly in Vivo's hands. Maintaining market leadership, preserving operational cash flow, and collecting a forty-nine percent share of manufacturing profits represents a practical compromise designed to minimize disruption. Second, Vivo is actively establishing a multi-hub manufacturing and brand strategy. In late May 2025, Vivo launched its product line in São Paulo, Brazil, under the Jovi sub-brand name. Because the "Vivo" trademark was already registered by local telecom operator Telefônica, the company adapted by entering under an alternate brand identity. Manufacturing was assigned to a local partner, GBR, with production lines established in the Manaus Free Trade Zone that went operational in January 2025. Complemented by established market positions in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Latin America is emerging as Vivo's next core strategic region. The Brazilian operating model serves as a template tailored for the post-India era: brand names can adapt, manufacturing can be outsourced to regional assembly partners, and market entry moves forward without exposing heavy physical assets to single-jurisdiction legal risk. The experience in India delivers a clear lesson on corporate asset ownership: deep operational localization alone is no longer an absolute defense, making governance structure and geographic diversification essential indicators of long-term resilience.7月24日，旭阳新材IPO即将上会。